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Summary: During the past years, developing countries have become extremely interesting 
for researchers, as well as for capital investors. Even if they lack macroeconomic indicator 
stability or sufficiently mature financial markets, they provide a quick growth and the 
perspective of a solid development as long as these countries identify measures that will 
stimulate foreign investors to invest. One such measure is increasing the quality of corporate 
governance at the level of small and medium-sized enterprises, where it is currently almost 
absent. This article aims to help raise awareness of the need to implement good corporate 
management practices at the level of companies in developing countries and especially in 
Romania. This paper uses a questionnaire in order to evaluate the state of the corporate 
governance in Timis county and offers some suggestions on what should be done for a higher 
corporate governance quality in the case of small and medium-sized companies in Romania, 
with the purpose of establishing a connection between governance quality and business 
performance of SMEs. 
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1. Corporate governance evolution 
 
The quick development of the international markets and the high level of connectivity 
between these markets have generated the need for systems that would allow the participants 
on the globalized markets to understand the rules. The level of organization on each market is 
highly dependent on the maturity of the market. 
The mature markets have applied complicated governance systems for a long time now. Still, 
the developing countries are behind. The Latin word „gubernare” was accepted by the 
literature under the form of “governance”, which can be translated as „to direct”, „to lead” or 
„to govern”. The concept started to develop at the end of last century, when, as competition 
grew on the international markets and companies developed further and further, the ties 
between managers and shareholders grew increasingly weaker. In 2012, Tricker wrote that 
countries should stimulate the development of a set of corporate laws that could constitute the 
basis of complex corporate governance codes, needed in order to offer companies the 
guidelines of how they should be led and controlled.  
The „corporate governance” sets the „rules of the game” within the company, being made up 
of a set of control elements operating together to regulate the relationship between all those 
that have an interest in the company, also known as stakeholders but also making reference to 
the social responsibility undertaken, to business ethics, to the truthfulness of financial data 
provided to third parties, to institutional and reporting transparency. 
The first general set of corporate governance principles was offered by OECD and was 
centred round the transparency of financial-accounting information. OECD considered that 
the quality of the disclosed information plays a significant role in the decision-making process 
and therefore, for the stability of the integrated financial markets, a set of rules is needed. The 
DOI: 10.17626/dBEM.ICoM.P00.2015.p066 
350 
 
principles they issued, were meant to improve the regulation framework concerning the 
company management, to protect the interests of both majority and minority shareholders.  
Corporate governance has developed a lot during the last few decades and generated a few 
different approaches. The first corporate governance theory was the agency theory, which is 
based on the assumption that the main role of organizations is to maximize their owners’ 
wealth. This theory studies and solves the differences arising between the principals 
(shareholders), that entrusts the management of their own interests to agents, and the agents 
(managers). A big problem of this theory is that in many companies, the connections between 
shareholders and managers or boards of directors are weak, meaning that even if managers are 
the employees of the owners, they keep their independence and try to reach their own goals 
which can be very different from those of the owners. The power of the managers increases 
when the shareholding is scattered and the owners are uninformed. Information asymmetry is 
very important and increases the tensions between the different stakeholders.   
McCahery et al. (2006) point out that a high-quality system of corporate governance requires 
institutions and mechanisms to ensure a management focusing on shareholders’ welfare, a 
management board made up mainly of non-executive managers, and a corporate regulating 
system to protect minority investors. In 2001, Mulili and Wong (2001) talk about an adverse 
selection, when a principal cannot ascertain whether an agent uses his/her powers to do the 
job he/she is paid for. They also talk about the moral hazard, which is when the principle does 
not know for sure that the agent is making all efforts to meet the goals for which he/she has 
been granted power of attorney.  
Another theory is the stakeholder theory. This theory considers that managers serve a 
complex system of people, which includes shareholders and managers, creditors, clients, 
suppliers, the state, and other people from the company’s environment, each of them having 
their own set of objectives and purposes. This theory was developed by Richard Edward 
Freeman. The goal of a company’s management is to integrate and administer the relations 
between investors, suppliers, creditors, employees, customers, the community, and other 
groups that can guarantee the organization’s success in the long run (Fontaine et al., 2006) 
and for the success of the company, none of the stakeholders can be excluded. The company 
needs to create value for all the interest groups around it, without any difference among them. 
This is based on the concept of corporate social responsibility.  
Managers are believed to be people whose activity is guided by a set of fundamental ethical 
values and principles, based on altruism and good reputation, to the detriment of their 
individual interest and their personal short-term financial purposes. This and some sociology 
and psychology theories stood at the basis of the stewardship theory. It is based on the idea 
that managers put the collective interests above their own, the main reason of such a 
behaviour being that when the company is well, the manager will also benefit. Managers work 
to obtain high profits for the company and higher returns for the shareholders (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994), without taking advantage of the opportunities that arise for themselves as 
individuals. They take into account stakeholders’ wishes and expectations and carry out their 
activity in a responsible manner in relation with them. Still, the big managerial faults that lead 
to major companies bankruptcy, have proven this theory to be wrong.  
The political model of corporate governance, present in Turnbull works (Turnbull, 1997), 
considers that the allocation of corporate power is determined by the political factor. On the 
other hand, companies also play a part in shaping political, legal, and regulatory systems.  
The managerial hegemony theory shows that managers are the ones controlling the 
companies, having the central and dominant role, while the owners have no direct implication 
in the decisions took. Organizational behaviour, the decisions being taken, and the company 
performance are most often influenced by such authoritative managers; even the appointment 
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and approval of independent members of the management board is strongly influenced by 
executive managers’ power, dominance, and personality. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) consider that organizations depend on specific resources. The 
company management lies between the company and the resources needed for meeting goals. 
The resource-dependency theory views the environment as the main source of the resources 
needed for business; in order to obtain these resources, the company needs to establish 
relations with other individuals.  
All of these theories just support the ideas of Sir Adrian Cadbury, who believed that the main 
preoccupation of governance should be to maintain balance between the company’s economic 
and social goals, as well as between individual and collective goals, in an attempt to „align as 
much as possible the interests of individuals, of the company, and of society”.  
Taking all of this into account we aim to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: That the approach towards corporate governance used by small and medium size 
companies in Timis county is similar to the one present in developing countries 
 
2. Methodology and results 
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we have applied a questionnaire upon 100 small and medium 
size companies from Timis County, from different fields of activity, between 2008 and 2013. 
The questionnaire used as a data collection instrument was highly structured and contains 
mostly closed questions, with a few open ones as well.  
In the questionnaire we have included questions regarding both financial aspects (financial 
indicators, evolution from the financial point of view), as well as questions regarding the 
principles that apply in the company and to what extent corporate governance principles (even 
if not clearly stipulated) apply. 
The study showed that only 62 of the 100 companies that we’ve investigated are still 
operating normally, while 32 are bankrupt and the others have ceased to operate for economic 
and personal reasons. We have found that the companies that willingly closed down were 
generally small companies (with up to 5 employees), having a turnover of less than 50,000 
Euros. One of the big problems of these companies was that there was no information 
transparency even between departments, so that problems identified by the financial-
accounting department were not even signalled to the company management. 
One important aspect that we took into account was that the companies we’ve investigated are 
companies that perform their activities into a developing economy, where economic activity 
is dominated by growth and industrialization, the macroeconomic indicators are very volatile 
and there is a high degree of risk regarding investments. Transition countries are similar 
between themselves but not identical as their past is very different: some were developed 
before the rise of communism, and private property had generated a strong economy, based 
on small and medium-sized enterprises, others did not experience a mentality based on public 
property. A feature of developing economies is that there are a small number of large 
companies, with high financial potential and that the small and medium-sized businesses, do 
not usually have corporate governance codes. Authors generally believe that the rules, 
standards, principles, and practices ensuring good corporate governance are found in joint-
stock companies, which is why approaching corporate governance in developing countries is 
a delicate undertaking, as we are talking about the quality of corporate governance in 
companies for which this cannot be imposed in any way. Bollard (2003) claims that corporate 
governance codes imposed in their cases could make a significant change. Economic 
development can only occur by stimulating the development of sustainable entities, created 
based on sound principles and closely supervised by well-defined regulation and control 
institutions.  
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In the 90’s, many developing countries attempted to implement corporate governance 
principles as those used in Western countries, without taking into account the lack of the 
needed institutional structure. In the case of the 8 economies that joined the EU in 2004, EU 
has provided the stability and guidance needed for institutional restructuring, increasing their 
credibility in the eyes of investors. Even though the application of Western governance 
models has not yielded the desired results in all cases, the literature shows that most transition 
countries still apply models taken from Western countries, they still have a weak institutional 
structure concerning corporate governance. 
This was also proven by the answers to our questionnaires. In Romania, corporate governance 
is a relatively new concept and the corporate sector is still dominated by acute informational 
opacity. This lack of transparency, doubled by the lack of a sound system for governing 
corporations, sends a negative signal to potential foreign investors, who have no guarantees 
regarding the stability of the business environment. The analysis of the activity of the 62 
companies in Timis county that survived the 2008-2013 crisis period reveals that, even though 
they had no actual written codes of good practices, they did apply corporate governance 
principles. Their business organization revealed a series of common elements: rigorous 
procedures for management supervision and control and for eliminating the risks of wrong or 
fraudulent management; analysing and rethinking activities by eliminating unprofitable ones; 
reorganizing the company by eliminating inefficient positions; the existence of a regularly 
updated manual of accounting procedures with the presentation of accounting rules and 
treatments; systematic cash-flow monitoring; drafting revenue and expenditure budgets and 
making sure to stick to them at all times. 
The study shows that most bankrupt companies (73.08%) did not implement a risk control 
system. Also, quite many of them (92,31%) did not draft a good practice guide or defined a 
risk management system. 30.77% of them believe cooperation between management and 
accounting to be just necessary.  
 
3. Conclusions 
 
The study allowed us to identify problems at the level of the Timis County SMEs, problems 
that are in many cases connected with the absence of corporate governance rules, which 
increases the opacity of information provided to third parties, lowers the protection of 
minority shareholders, decreases the definition of tasks within the entity’s management 
bodies, and last, but not least, generates a negative impact on the performance obtained. 
Corporate governance becomes an “umbrella” that offers a frame for the control and reporting 
based on the risk management and also offers an efficient internal control system that can 
insure the reaching of the companies’ goals in terms of performance and management 
responsibilities. A company where the shareholders have control over the business and 
applies corporate governance standards offers an insurance for the shareholders as the 
predictable risks can be anticipated and managed in the right manner. Still, this does not 
ensure the success of the company but only a reasonable chance for the company to remain on 
the market.  
The study still needs to be developed and we are going to look at the 7 pillars that are 
considered to stand at the basis of the corporate governance. We intend to see to what extend 
these main aspects of corporate governance can apply to small and medium size companies, 
especially in the case of companies located in emerging markets. We also intend to develop 
the study in order to cover not only the county level but also at the whole country level. 
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